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Tightening the OODA Loop: Police Militarization, Race, and Algorithmic 
Surveillance 
 
Jeffrey L. Vagle* 
 
Abstract 
This Article examines the role military automated surveillance and intelligence 
systems and techniques have supported a self-reinforcing racial bias when used by 
civilian police departments to enhance predictive policing programs. I will focus 
on two facets of this problem. First, my research will take an inside-out 
perspective, studying the role played by advanced military technologies and 
methods within civilian police departments, and how they have enabled a new 
focus on deterrence and crime prevention by creating a system of structural 
surveillance where decision support relies increasingly upon algorithms and 
automated data analysis tools, and which automates de facto penalization and 
containment based on race. Second, I will explore these systems—and their 
effects—from an outside-in perspective, paying particular attention to racial, 
societal, economic, and geographic factors that play into the public perception of 
these policing regimes. I will conclude by proposing potential solutions to this 
problem, which incorporate tests for racial bias to create an alternative system that 
follows a true community policing model. 
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As militaries transition from a war footing to a postwar posture, they inevitably 
shed excess equipment and technology that is outdated, no longer needed, or too 
expensive to maintain. In the drawdown from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. 
military found willing recipients of this materiel in local and state police departments. 
In addition to these technology transfers, local police departments have increasingly 
adopted military tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—originally conceived and 
designed for military units in combat operations—for use in their day-to-day policing. 
This combination has led to the overall militarization of civilian police forces in the 
United States, putting wartime tools in the hands of peace officers. 
This trend toward police militarization has found enthusiastic support in 
departments adhering to the “broken windows” theory of policing, especially with 
respect to technologies and TTPs meant for intelligence analysis or surveillance 
purposes. This phenomenon may be seen as the natural result of the industrial and post-
industrial society’s desire to maximize control and efficiency—across all spheres of life—
through careful observation and data analysis. While these advances have garnered 
many societal benefits, it has also established a system of structural surveillance that has 
entered a renaissance with the help of military technologies. Automated surveillance 
analysis systems, developed in the wake of 9/11, have given police departments a 
powerful toolkit to advance algorithmic policing strategies. But these algorithmic 
approaches too often target poor and minority communities, inserting a de facto racial 
component into the system, even when the automated intelligence systems are fed 
“objective” crime data. 
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This Article examines the role military automated surveillance and intelligence 
systems have supported a structure of self-reinforcing racial bias when used by civilian 
police departments to enhance predictive policing programs. I will focus on two facets of 
this problem. First, my research will take an inside-out perspective, studying the role 
played by advanced military technologies and methods within civilian police 
departments, and how they have enabled a new focus on deterrence and crime 
prevention by creating a system of structural surveillance where decision support relies 
increasingly upon algorithms and automated data analysis tools, and which automates 
de facto penalization and containment based on race. Second, I will explore these 
systems—and their effects—from an outside-in perspective, paying particular attention 
to racial, societal, economic, and geographic factors that play into the public perception 
of these policing regimes. I will conclude by proposing potential solutions to this 
problem, which incorporate tests for racial bias to create an alternative system that 
follows a true community policing model. 
II. The Militarization of Police Intelligence Operations 
The militarization of civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) has long been 
anathema to the founding principles of the United States, and viewed as corrosive to 
civil liberties in a constitutional democracy generally.1 Paradoxically, contemporary 
American society has increasingly taken a distinctly militaristic approach to solving its 
(non-military) political, social, and economic issues, applying war metaphors to 
programs and policies to emphasize the seriousness of the problem and the approach to 
                                                   
1 See Phillip T. Wyrick, Police Militarization: Attitudes Towards the Militarization of the 
American Police, (2013), http://dc.etsu.edu/etd/1161/ (last visited Sep 4, 2015). 
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it.2 These mixed signals have been the backdrop to a steady increase in the militarization 
of U.S. civilian police forces post-World War II, with racial tensions, “broken windows 
policing,” the “war on drugs,” and the “global war on terror” acting as the primary 
catalysts of this phenomenon.3 The most visible aspect of police militarization can be 
seen in the increased deployment within LEAs of weapons, equipment, and training 
designed for use in combat by militaries.4 While these manifestations might be the most 
outwardly obvious signs of this trend, there is a more basic facet of militarization that 
LEAs have almost universally adopted—intelligence operations.5 
A. Military Intelligence and the Development of the OODA 
Loop 
The importance of intelligence operations to the military is a long accepted 
principle, based on the fact that as often quite large and distributed organizations, 
militaries are expected to think and act as if they were a unitary being.6 The pace, 
environment, and sheer horror of combat combine to create a state of near chaos—“the 
province of uncertainty”—through which militaries are forced to navigate.7 In order to 
                                                   
2 See Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise and 
Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 1–18 (1997). 
3 Id.; Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as pretext: Marijuana, race, and the new 
disorder in New York City street policing, 7 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 591–633 
(2010); Bernard E Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken windows: New evidence from New 
York City and a five-city social experiment, The University of Chicago Law Review 271–
320 (2006); Jamila Michener, Neighborhood Disorder and Local Participation: 
Examining the Political Relevance of “Broken Windows,” 35 Political Behavior 777–806 
(2013); Steve Herbert, Policing the contemporary city: Fixing broken windows or 
shoring up neo-liberalism? 5 Theoretical Criminology 445–466 (2001). 
4 Peter B. Kraska & Louis J. Cubellis, Militarizing mayberry and beyond: Making sense of 
American paramilitary policing, 14 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 607–629 (1997). 
5 Robert W. Taylor & Amanda L. Russell, The failure of police “fusion” centers and the concept 
of a national intelligence sharing plan, 13 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 184–200 (2012). 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1909). 
7 Id.  
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mitigate at least some of the disorienting effects of warfare, modern militaries must 
organize themselves around rational, bureaucratic principles, with robust networks of 
communication and information management at their core.8 Military command 
structures simply can not function without the timely communication of information on 
a wide range of broad and narrow topics including terrain, troop strength and 
movements, civilian considerations, transportation networks, availability of supplies, 
enemy disposition and morale, weather and light conditions, and more—all in support 
of the theory that the better prepared and informed army has the advantage.9 This 
general concept is often referred to as military intelligence, or more succinctly, 
“intelligence.”10 
The term intelligence is not well defined, however, as it draws from a wide array 
of broader issues, such as strategy, command and control, and communications.11 It is 
clearly more than an exhaustive cataloging of all available information. Even if this was 
                                                   
8 M. D. Feld, Information and Authority: The Structure of Military Organization, 24 AMERICAN 
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 15 (1959). The concept of bureaucratic organization is essential to 
efficient military operations, where the principles of military command require levels of 
predictability and control at a level of scalability that precludes ad hoc organization. Because 
warfare is, by nature, chaotic and corrosive to organization and communication, military 
organizations attempt to minimize these effects through levels of bureaucratic stability that 
enable information flow—one of the essential requirements of command. Id.  
9 John A. Allen et al., A framework for supporting human military planning, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCE, LONDON 
UK (2008), https://www.usukita.org/papers/3857/CPM%20Framework.pdf (last visited Sep 11, 
2015). The hierarchical bureaucracy of military organizations is based around the need to 
efficiently pass information, intent, plans, and commands up and down the chain of command 
that is both time sensitive and scalable to large organizations. 
10 See Michael I. Handel, Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise, in MICHAEL 
I HANDEL, RICHARD K BETTS & THOMAS G MAHNKEN, PARADOXES OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MICHAEL I. HANDEL (2003).  
11 See MICHAEL WARNER, WANTED: A DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE (2002), 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA525816 (last 
visited Sep 11, 2015). 
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possible, such a tool would quickly prove useless to militaries as their organizations 
became mired in irrelevant information, and would be forced to spend valuable time 
and resources ferreting out the useful bits.12 Intelligence, therefore, must produce 
information in a form and quantity that can be used by the organization to make timely 
decisions regarding plans and operations. This characteristic is often summarized as 
“actionable” intelligence.13 The goal of perfectly actionable intelligence is often 
unattainable, however, and is best thought of in aspirational terms.14 
The industrialization of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries yielded paradigmatic 
advances in the technology and, subsequently, the conduct of warfare, which in turn 
brought with it the critical need for more rapidly-made decisions based upon fresher, 
more accurate, and more copious intelligence.15 The United States military experience in 
Vietnam illustrated just how crucial intelligence and communications had become in 
                                                   
12 See Robert L. Bateman III, Avoiding Information Overload, 78 MILITARY REVIEW 53 
(1998). 
13 Andrew Rathmell, Towards postmodern intelligence, 17 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 87–104 (2002). 
14 In fact, as military intelligence related incidents involving torture, untruths, and 
censorship over the past decade have shown us, the remorseless pursuit of perfectly 
actionable intelligence has led to bloated military contractor budgets, loss of friendly 
and civilian life, and atrocities. See, e.g., SEYMOUR M. HERSH & PETER FRIEDMAN, CHAIN OF 
COMMAND (2004), http://samizdat.cc/shelf/documents/2004/05.10-hersh/hersh.pdf (last visited 
Sep 11, 2015). 
15 Military theoreticians divide the history of modern warfare into four generations, each 
of which marked by technical, political, economic or social changes or advances. The 
first generation of modern warfare emerged with the widespread use of gunpowder and 
the shift in Europe from a feudal economy to the modern nation-state. Second 
generation warfare is identified with the nation-state’s ability to generate large revenue 
streams through widespread taxation on increasing wealth. The German Blitzkrieg is the 
starting point of third generation warfare, with high maneuverability being used to 
break the protracted impasses characteristic of World War I. Finally, fourth generation 
warfare—the mode in which theorists currently put us—is summarized by enormous 
advances in communications and weapon technologies along with the rise of guerilla 
movements and asymmetric warfare. See THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: 
ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2006). 
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modern warfare, where larger, better equipped forces were often outmatched by much 
smaller, yet better informed, groups of guerillas and regular army soldiers.16 The post-
Vietnam collapse of the U.S. military sent shock waves through the Pentagon, whose 
leadership began the arduous process of rebuilding a communications- and intelligence-
centric army capable of fighting a fourth generation war.17 
During this period of reconstitution in the U.S. military, a U.S. Air Force combat 
flight instructor named John Boyd, long known for his highly analytical approach to 
solving military problems, took on the challenge of intelligence and communication in a 
fast-moving conflict, and began to develop a general theory of of military organizational 
analysis and action.18 As a veteran of air combat flying the F-86 Sabre in “MiG Alley” 
during the Korean War, Boyd knew well the need for fighter pilots to gather, process, 
and act on information in a very short amount of time, all while flying an aircraft filled 
with jet fuel and munitions at hundreds of miles per hour, often while being shot at.19 
                                                   
16 A prime example of this phenomenon can be found in the January 1968 Tet Offensive, 
where North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) guerilla forces conducted a 
series of well-timed, highly-coordinated attacks on U.S. military installations and South 
Vietnamese government buildings across all of South Vietnam. While these attacks were 
ultimately repulsed by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, the widespread effects of the 
offensive marked the beginning of the end of the American war in Vietnam. Historians 
and military theorists widely attribute much of the success of the outnumbered NVA and 
VC forces to poor U.S. military intelligence, which completely failed to anticipate the Tet 
Offensive as well as the military, political, and social costs that would follow from it. See 
JAMES J. WIRTZ, THE TET OFFENSIVE: INTELLIGENCE FAILURE IN WAR (1994). 
17 See HARRY G. SUMMERS, ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR (1995). 
18 See Scott E. McIntosh, The Wingman-philosopher of MiG alley: John Boyd and the OODA 
loop, 58 AIR POWER HISTORY 24 (2011). 
19 See David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis, 
(1995). It is somewhat noteworthy that Boyd himself shot down no enemy aircraft during his 
combat tour in Korea. This was due not to a lack of combat sorties—Boyd flew 22—but to the 
fact that all of his combat flights were as a wingman, rather than lead. His perspective and 
experience in this role, however, may well have given Boyd the insights he later developed in his 
military theories and instruction. Scott E. McIntosh, The Wingman-philosopher of MiG alley: 
John Boyd and the OODA loop, 58 AIR POWER HISTORY 24 (2011). 
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Boyd, a student not only of the great modern military theorists such as Clausewitz and 
J.F.C. Fuller, but also of philosophers, mathematicians, and physicists, including Kurt 
Gödel and Werner Heisenberg, actively sought out symmetries and commonalities in his 
analyses in an attempt to get at the true root of the problem at hand.20 His 
multidisciplinary approach allowed him to extrapolate common principles from his 
experiences, and in 1976, he published the first of five essays on the cognitive, 
psychological, and temporal processes core to all military intelligence analysis and 
decision-making processes, from the highest command levels to the lowest.21 
Boyd’s described his groundbreaking theory as a cognitive cycle containing four 
tasks: Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action (OODA) (see Figure 1).22  
                                                   
20 See David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis, 
(1995). 
21 Id.  
22 Since this Article is not devoted to Boyd’s OODA loop per se, I will restrict the cycle’s 
description to its most basic form. Boyd’s insight can still be quite easily seen in this 
summarized version, as it describes the rational human behavior found in individuals as 
well as organizations. For a more detailed analysis of the OODA loop, see Id.; A K 
Cebrowski & J J Garstka, Network-centric warfare: Its origin and future, US Naval 
Institute Proceedings (1998); S E McIntosh, The Wingman-philosopher of MiG alley: 
John Boyd and the OODA loop, Air Power History (2011). 
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Figure 1: The OODA Loop 
Through an informed utilization of the Boyd Cycle—more often referred to as the 
OODA loop—one could not only gain a strategic or tactical advantage over one’s enemy, 
but in turn, disrupt the enemy’s own OODA loop by denying them the ability to run 
through their own Boyd Cycle due to the speed at which you are able to run through 
your own.23 The goal for any military organization, according to Boyd, is to increase the 
speed at which it can navigate this cycle, or “tightening” the OODA loop.24 The army that 
is able to manage the tightest OODA loop is therefore able to “get inside” their 
opponent’s cycle, thus disrupting their ability to gather, process, and act on 
intelligence.25 
                                                   
23 Id. 
24 See S E McIntosh, The Wingman-philosopher of MiG alley: John Boyd and the 







The OODA loop was, as Boyd observed, a characterization of the process all living 
things go through as part of their everyday survival.26 Learning and adapting were what 
successful individuals and groups accomplished faster than their less lucky 
competitors—Boyd had distilled this naturally occurring process into a form which could 
be analyzed and executed by military strategists and tacticians. Boyd continued to 
develop this concept through the mid-1980s, and continued to present his theories to 
large military and civilian audiences well into his retirement.27 Boyd’s theories enjoyed 
moderate success among contemporary military leadership at the time, mainly among 
theorists and scholars. But in the early 2000s, his ideas were rediscovered and found a 
heightened relevance among a new generation of warriors joining a high-tech military in 
a post-9/11 world.28 This renewed popularity soared even further, when non-military 
and quasi-military organizations seeking competitive advantage through information-
centric efficiency—universally accepted as the path to success since the earliest days of 
industrialization—increasingly turned to military organizational theories and doctrines 
for inspiration.29 
                                                   
26 See Scott E. McIntosh, The Wingman-philosopher of MiG alley: John Boyd and the OODA 
loop, 58 AIR POWER HISTORY 24 (2011). 
27 Id. 
28 This phenomenon will be more fully explored in Section III, infra. 
29 Since the mid-1990s, business and other non-military organizations—especially those 
in America—have fostered the emergence of a sizable cottage industry of books, 
consultants, and other organizational coaches applying military “lessons learned” to 
non-military environments. See, e.g., Douglas C. Bernhardt, “I want it fast, factual, 
actionable”—tailoring competitive intelligence to executives’ needs, 27 LONG RANGE PLANNING 
12–24 (1994); GENE KLANN, CRISIS LEADERSHIP: USING MILITARY LESSONS, ORGANIZATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES, AND THE POWER OF INFLUENCE TO LESSEN THE IMPACT OF CHAOS ON THE PEOPLE 
YOU LEAD (2003); MARK C. BENDER, OPERATION EXCELLENCE: SUCCEEDING IN BUSINESS AND 
LIFE, THE U.S. MILITARY WAY (2004); PARTHA BOSE, ALEXANDER THE GREAT’S ART OF 
STRATEGY: THE TIMELESS LEADERSHIP LESSONS OF HISTORY’S GREATEST EMPIRE BUILDER 
(2004); DAN CARRISON & ROD WALSH, SEMPER FI: BUSINESS LEADERSHIP THE MARINE CORPS 
WAY (2004); SCOTT W. CHRISTIE, PRECISION GUIDED LEADERSHIP: HOW MODERN MILITARY 
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B. The Audit Society and the Allure of Information 
Management 
While Boyd’s OODA loop theories were revolutionary in their military context, 
their foundations began to form nearly two centuries earlier with the emergence of 
industrialization and the associated growth of information-centric organizational 
theory.30 The rise of bureaucracy as an efficient means of organizing at scales 
unnecessary in agrarian society brought with it a strong inclination toward surveillance, 
information processing, and data-based planning as a means of constant management 
and improvement, a school of thought both inspired and followed by military 
organizational theory.31 Weber’s theory of legitimate order and authority within a 
bureaucratic structure, with its “dut[ies] without regard to personal considerations,” 
and an “obligation to obedience,” provided the sort of military-based organizational 
                                                   
DOCTRINE CAN SAVE CORPORATE AMERICA (2004); ANTHONY J. LE STORTI, WHEN YOU’RE 
ASKED TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE: PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS TEAMWORK AND LEADERSHIP FROM THE 
U.S. ARMY’S ELITE RANGERS (2003). This phenomenon would have been largely unthinkable in 
the fifteen years between the American military’s ignominious withdrawal from Vietnam and its 
rebuilt success in the First Gulf War, the hangover from which lingered through 2001 in the form 
of military contempt for its civilian leadership. See Richard H. Kohn, Out of Control: The Crisis 
in Civil-Military Relations, 35 THE NATIONAL INTEREST 3–17 (1994).  
30 See Max Weber, Economy and Society (1978) 969-73; James R. Beniger, The Control 
Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society (1986) 7 
[hereinafter Control Revolution]; Edward Higgs, The Rise of the Information State: The 
Development of Central State Surveillance of the Citizen in England, 1500-2000, 14 
Journal of Hist. Sociology 175 (2001); MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT EXPLOSION (1994); 
Michael Power, Evaluating the audit explosion, 25 LAW & POLICY 185–202 (2003). 
31 See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (1985); Ulrich Beck, Risk 
Society and the Provident State, in Risk, Environment and Modernity: Toward a New 
Ecology, Scott Lash et al., eds. (1998). Beck describes the need for increased surveillance 
as a direct result of industrial society, when the “social, political, ecological, and 
individual risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control 
and protective institutions of industrial society.” Id. at 27. When these new or expanded 
risks outstrip the existing capacities of analysis, policy, or regulation to understand or 
cope with the issue, pressure is created to develop new methods of surveillance and 
control. 
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socialization needed—albeit with some allowance of modification for less martial 
pursuits—for the management of such modern concepts as large-scale factories, prisons, 
hospitals, and law enforcement.32 
Militaries of the 18th and 19th centuries were quick to adopt these organizational 
innovations, which fit quite well with their existing hierarchical frameworks and began 
to give them the tools to realize a modern form of military intelligence and personnel 
management which existing organizational models would not support.33 All of these 
advances were necessary to support and maintain large armies, but military intelligence 
was perhaps the biggest beneficiary of these innovations. The increasing amounts of 
information necessary to make military decisions within the increasingly complex world 
brought about by modernization and industrialization highlighted the importance of 
bureaucracy as an essential tool in dealing with the modern crisis of control.34 But even 
with the benefit of a modern bureaucracy, some of which already existed within military 
organizations, an army’s ability to process intelligence information had been quite 
limited by existing technologies.35 This limitation of a military organization’s ability to 
                                                   
32 See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 330-40 (2009). 
33 The need for larger and more widely distributed militaries, driven largely by the 
expanding imperial goals of many nations, created serious organizational problems for 
military leadership. Muster lists, payroll records, logistics planning, and many other of 
the modern military’s more prosaic tasks benefited greatly from these new forms of 
communication and information processing. See Edward Higgs, The Rise of the Information 
State: The Development of the Central State Surveillance of the Citizen in England, 1500-2000, 
14 JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY (2001). 
34 Reinhard Bendix notes that any study of modern bureaucracy must acknowledge both 
the challenges to and protections of individual freedoms: “[T]he modern critics of the 
‘service state’ tend to forget that governmental ‘interference’ has increased individual 
freedom by promoting social security, just as the earlier governmental aid in the 
development of corporate enterprise and western expansion increased the freedom of 
the business man.” Bendix, Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power, 5 Public 
Administration Review 194, 195 (1945). 
35 Beniger at 9. 
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make informed decisions based on “coded” intelligence information was directly 
dependent upon its ability to communicate, store, and process that information, 
described in Weber’s concept of rationalization.36 The promise of increasingly detailed 
intelligence pictures—improved “situational awareness”—brought about through a 
combination of the improved organizational methods of Weberian bureaucracy and the 
advances in communication, transportation, and information processing technologies of 
industrialization, began to move military thinking toward an information-centric style of 
warfare.37 
This quest for more information, better data handling tools to sift and analyze 
that information, and improved methods of communicating the results of this analysis 
in order to maximize efficiency through informed decision-making has become 
paradigmatic of modern (and post-modern) society.38 This “control revolution,” as 
Beniger puts it, has grown to permeate every area of society where efficiency is sought, 
bringing with it a need to develop metric spaces within which to measure and evaluate 
                                                   
36 Rationalization is the proposition that an organization’s creation and containment of 
power through control can increase either through increasing the organization’s 
capability to process coded information, or by limiting the amount of that information 
to be processed. Id. at 15-16. The modern military modified this concept by maximizing 
both precepts: increasing information processing capability in order effectively decrease 
the amount of information that is processed. 
37 This is not to say that modernization has solved the military intelligence problem, of 
course. Indeed, the same organizational and technological advances that have enabled 
the modern military intelligence framework have also yielded an increasingly complex 
and and chaotic world within which militaries are expected to operate. See Andrew 
Rathmell, Towards postmodern intelligence, 17 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 87–104 
(2002); THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2006). 
38 See JAMES BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION (1986); Edward Higgs, The Rise of the 
Information State: The Development of the Central State Surveillance of the Citizen in England, 
1500-2000, 14 JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY (2001); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY (1978). 
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an activity’s effectiveness.39 The concept of civilian police agencies is driven primarily as 
an executive facet of a society’s social control function, and as such, makes them prime 
candidates for the information-centric style of organization and leadership.40 
The quasi-military structure most police departments now adhere to can be 
found in the organization of Sir Robert Peel’s London Metropolitan Police in 1829, 
credited as the first modern civilian law enforcement organization.41 The rapid 
industrialization of Europe and the United States in the first half of the 19th century 
                                                   
39 This concept is not always as uncontroversial as it might seem on the surface. For 
example, one of the chief criticisms of Utilitarianism, an early version of the 
information-centric movement originally promulgated by Bentham and Mill, has been 
in its concentration on the maximization of utility, which in turn requires that 
measurability is always an option. Such an approach can not apply to every human 
endeavor, say critics, as there are concepts like morality and justice that defy 
measurement. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 164 
(1958); Beniger; Reinhard Bendix, Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power, 5 PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 194 (1945);  
40 The use of the term social control function bears with it a requirement to explain its 
definition in this context. Here, I refer to control in its most general sense—to influence 
or direct behavior toward some predetermined goal. This definition is informed by the 
sociology literature, which examines the social relationship, the organization, voluntary 
or compulsory social participation, and consensual and imposed order. Hence, control, 
in this sense, is primarily concerned with the two elements of influence and purpose, 
and control theory—in both the sociological and mathematical senses—require facilities 
for the communication and processing of information in order to manage behavior 
through feedback. See Richard Bellman, Control Theory, 211 Scientific Am. 186 (1964); 
J.W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics: A Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers, 36 
Harvard Bus. Rev. 37 (1958); William T. Powers, Behavior: The control of perception 
(1973). 
41 See James H. Auten, Paramilitary Model of Police and Police Professionalism, The, 4 POLICE 
STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 67 (1981); J. L. Lyman, The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829: 
An Analysis of Certain Events Influencing the Passage and Character of the Metropolitan Police 
Act in England, 55 THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCIENCE 141 
(1964); John M. Jermier & Leslie J. Berkes, Leader Behavior in a Police Command 
Bureaucracy: A Closer Look at the Quasi-Military Model, 24 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE 
QUARTERLY 1 (1979). 
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brought with it a sudden population increases, much of it concentrated in urban areas.42 
This caused no small amount of concern among the upper class, who feared disease, 
petty crime, property damage, and political insurrections, just to name a few of the 
phobias the ruling elite held regarding the “dangerous classes.”43 Peel, who while Chief 
Secretary for Ireland introduced legislation creating paramilitary forces to suppress 
Catholic and nationalist “disturbances,” applied the lessons from Ireland to London, and 
continued the use of the military organization as a model for civilian law enforcement.44 
The quasi-military civilian police organization was necessary, Peel argued, since “the 
police must be stable, efficient and organized along military lines” in order to enable 
strict and unquestioning—Weberian—discipline in order to allow rapid mobilization in 
public emergencies.45 In addition, Peel recognized that former members of the military 
made excellent candidates for the role of civilian police officer, since they would arrive 
                                                   
42 See J. L. Lyman, The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829: An Analysis of Certain Events 
Influencing the Passage and Character of the Metropolitan Police Act in England, 55 THE 
JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCIENCE 141 (1964). 
43 See Id.; Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence. Giddens argues that the crisis of 
control brought about by industrialization required a dramatic change in the way the 
state viewed its citizens, as “no pre-modern states were able even to approach the level 
of administrative co-ordination developed in the [modern] nation-state.” Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity 57 (1990). 
44 See Tadhg O’ Ceallaigh, Peel and Police Reform in Ireland, 1814-18, 6 STUDIA HIBERNICA 
25–48 (1966); J. L. Lyman, The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829: An Analysis of Certain Events 
Influencing the Passage and Character of the Metropolitan Police Act in England, 55 THE 
JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCIENCE 141 (1964); James H. Auten, 
Paramilitary Model of Police and Police Professionalism, The, 4 POLICE STUD.: INT’L REV. 
POLICE DEV. 67 (1981). 
45 See J. L. Lyman, The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829: An Analysis of Certain Events 
Influencing the Passage and Character of the Metropolitan Police Act in England, 55 THE 
JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCIENCE 141 (1964); Martin E. 
Spencer, Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority, 21 THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 
123 (1970); James H. Auten, Paramilitary Model of Police and Police Professionalism, The, 4 
POLICE STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 67 (1981); John M. Jermier & Leslie J. Berkes, Leader 
Behavior in a Police Command Bureaucracy: A Closer Look at the Quasi-Military Model, 24 
ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 1 (1979). 
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on the job pre-acclimated to a quasi-military environment, and would have an 
instinctive feel for hierarchy, discipline, and order.46 
These somewhat practical decisions cannot, however, be separated entirely from 
the growth of information-centric organization theory, political economics, and 
surveillance technologies which were interlaced with much of the social, political, and 
economic activity of industrialization and modernity.47 In the period from the mid-18th 
through mid-19th centuries, as industrialization in western nations began to create 
increasingly complex systems of interdependencies between manufacturing, capital, 
energy production, labor, and markets, new means of communication and control were 
required to take full advantage of new economies of scale and realize productivity levels 
unheard of under earlier forms of management and organization.48 As Giddens points 
                                                   
46 There is something of a “chicken and egg” relationship between Peel’s quasi-military 
organization of the London Metropolitan Police and the natural fit with former 
members of the British military: was a quasi-military organizational structure selected 
for its qualities as best suited for civilian policing, thus making military men (and they 
were all men) the best candidates for the job? Or was the choice of a quasi-military 
police force preordained by the desired characteristics and availability of former 
soldiers? The literature suggests the former, but even today, we still see a career 
transition from soldier to civilian police officer as quite natural. See J. L. Lyman, The 
Metropolitan Police Act of 1829: An Analysis of Certain Events Influencing the Passage and 
Character of the Metropolitan Police Act in England, 55 THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, 
CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCIENCE 141 (1964); James H. Auten, Paramilitary Model of Police 
and Police Professionalism, The, 4 POLICE STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 67 (1981); John M. 
Jermier & Leslie J. Berkes, Leader Behavior in a Police Command Bureaucracy: A Closer Look 
at the Quasi-Military Model, 24 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 1 (1979). 
47 While industrialization flattened somewhat the complex class relationships in 
England and elsewhere, social norms and values increased in complexity, attracting a 
new generation of political, economic, and social theorists to the tasks of making sense 
of changes to social order and reestablishing control over existing social structures. See, 
e.g., Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798); Jeremy Bentham, 
A Fragment on Government (1776); James Mill, Elements of Political Economy (1821); 
David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). 
48 See JAMES BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION (1986). Among the innovations of 
industrialization, perhaps the most successful is that of the modern bureaucracy. Rapid 
advances in manufacturing and transportation technologies brought an abrupt end to 
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out, advances in the management of information enabled organizations to form more 
effective bureaucratic structures, and gave these budding bureaucracies more control 
over the “timing and spacing” of human activities.49 These advances, joined with the 
modern bureaucracy’s growing appetite for information ultimately led to the surveillant 
assemblage as integrated into our contemporary concept of governance.50  
In the mid-1990s, a movement among military theorists began to develop around 
the concept of exploiting a technological and communications advantage to create a new 
kind of army, where every soldier and piece of materiel was equipped with sensors that 
would allow direct communication of information at the lowest organizational levels, 
but would also pass this information up the chain of command to give military leaders a 
“god’s-eye view” of the battlespace, allowing for even tighter OODA loops.51 This 
concept, generally known as network-centric warfare, envisioned the sort of 
                                                   
millennia of primarily agricultural societies, and thus required new modes of thought 
around societal, economic, and political questions. New means of social control were 
necessary, as the dramatic increase in transactional speed brought about by 
industrialization quickly outpaced existing modes of control and interaction, and began 
to threaten the viability of existing institutions. Beniger characterizes this phenomenon 
as a “crisis of control,” a period in which a society’s organizational, information 
processing, and communication capabilities are outpaced by manufacturing and 
transportation technologies, resulting in a systemic loss of political and economic 
control which threatens existing social and governmental institutions and structures. 
See Beniger, Control Revolution, supra at 7-9. 
49 See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (2013) 46-48. 
50 See Kevin D Haggerty Richard V Ericson, The surveillant assemblage, 51 British 
Journal of Sociology 605–622 (2000); S P Hier, Probing the Surveillant Assemblage: 
on the dialectics of surveillance practices as processes of social control, Surveillance \& 
Society (2002). For a more complete analysis of this phenomenon, see Jeffrey L Vagle, 
The History, Means, and Effects of Structural Surveillance University of Pennsylvania 
Law School Faculty Scholarship 1–65 (2016), 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1625. 
51 See Arthur K. Cebrowski & John J. Garstka, Network-centric warfare: Its origin and future, 
124 in US NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 28–35 (1998), http://mattcegelske.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/ncw_origin_future.pdf (last visited Sep 20, 2015). 
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information-driven military hitherto impossible, now enabled by smaller, faster, and 
cheaper technology that was starting to drive American businesses, and especially 
advances in networking and communications.52 Military strategists picked up on the 
new style of “bottom-up” management enabled through these technological advances, 
where information, gathered from the very edges of an organization and passed to 
leadership in near real time, could allow leaders of even the very largest of businesses to 
view, analyze, and make decisions about detailed data—actionable intelligence—that 
Weber, Bentham, Mill, and their contemporaries could only dream of.53 Following this 
model, an information- and network-centric military could be more agile and aware 
than its adversaries, thus allowing fewer troops to cover much wider geographic areas, 
with less equipment, and with dynamic, ad-hoc supply chains that could place materiel 
in the right place at the right time, a philosophy at the center of Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld’s wholesale “force transformation” program of the early- and mid-
2000s.54 
                                                   
52 Id.  
53 One of the better known examples of early business adopters of this new information-
centric management style is Wal-Mart, which pioneered the concept of “precision 
retailing,” where a competitive advantage is created through their network of sensors 
deployed throughout all levels of their organization. This infrastructure fed real-time 
information through Wal-Mart’s networks, giving them the ability to make very well-
informed decisions on extremely accurate and fresh data, a concept whose usefulness 
was not lost on military planners. See DAVID S. ALBERTS, JOHN GARSTKA & FREDERICK P. 
STEIN, NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: DEVELOPING AND LEVERAGING INFORMATION SUPERIORITY 
(1999).  
54 While a full exploration of the history Rumsfeld’s Office of Force Transformation is 
well beyond the scope of this Article, it is relevant and worth noting that a wide array of 
analysis of the performance of the “transformed” military in Afghanistan and 
(especially) Iraq, led many to observe that the optimism about a small, lighter, network-
centric military was, at best, misplaced or premature, and at worst, willfully negligent. 
See also Jeffrey L. Groh, Network-centric warfare: Leveraging the power of information, 1 
USAWC GUIDE TO NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY 323–338 
(2008); How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social — Not 
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The Bush administration’s focus on transforming the military through a network-
centric shift from platforms to networks, while viewed with skepticism by rank-and-file 
troops, was enthusiastically accepted by the U.S. military’s civilian and political 
leadership, and opened up a wide array of new business opportunities for contractors 
willing to help implement this vision.55 Many of these new programs concentrated on 
                                                   
Electronic, WIRED, http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-
12/ff_futurewar?currentPage=all (last visited Sep 20, 2015); REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE, 
Military organization in the information age: Lessons from the world of business, 1016 
STRATEGIC APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE 327 (1999). 
 
55 In his 2003 Annual Report to the President and Congress, Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld articulated his vision for a network-centric military, and laid out the plans—
and associated risks—for force transformation. See DONALD H. RUMSFELD, ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS (2003), 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA423423 (last 
visited Sep 20, 2015). The proposed transition to a “21st century military” was sweeping, with a 
greater reliance on small, technology-equipped special forces teams, and a move away from the 
large, heavy army divisions built up over the Cold War. Rumsfeld estimated the initial cost of 
this transformation to be $24.3 billion, and $239 billion over all phases. Id. Later estimates, 
however, put the figure nearer to $1 trillion by 2010, with program costs continuing long into the 
future. See RUSSELL RUMBAUGH & HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, WHAT WE BOUGHT: DEFENSE 
PROCUREMENT FROM FY01 TO FY10 (2011), 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/134554/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/f
70118aa-be15-45be-ae5f-aa9930d003d8/en/Contentv2.pdf (last visited Sep 20, 2015). For 
example, the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, expected to cost $1.5 trillion alone over the life of the 
program, and has been questioned as an effective fighting platform. See The $1.5 trillion plane 
that broke the Air Force, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2014/07/31/how-dods-15-trillion-f-35-
broke-the-air-force.html (last visited Sep 20, 2015); Air Force Admits: Our New Stealth Fighter 
Can’t Fight - The Daily Beast, , http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/17/air-force-
admits-our-new-stealth-fighter-can-t-fight.html (last visited Sep 20, 2015). 
Funding for force transformation, coupled with the need to fight simultaneous wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, fueled an explosion of contractor business, with some programs continuing 
long past the point where military analysts could see value in them.  See Peter J. Dombrowski, 
Eugene Gholz & Andrew L. Ross, Selling military transformation: The defense industry and 
innovation, 46 ORBIS 523–536 (2002); Clay Wilson, Network Centric Warfare: Background and 
Oversight Issues for Congress, (2004), 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA476256 (last 
visited Sep 20, 2015); MICHAEL J. SIMMERING, TECHNOLOGICAL ILLUSIONS AND THE ENTROPY 
OF AMERICAN DEFENSE (2014), 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA600194 (last 
visited Sep 20, 2015). 
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the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) space, where the true power of distributed information 
superiority could be fully realized.56 Key programs quickly emerged to build survivable, 
robust communications and sensor networks, information operations (IO) platforms, 
geospatial analysis tools, computer-assisted targeting platforms, and unmanned 
intelligence gathering platforms (colloquially known as drones, and later equipped with 
weapons systems of their own), all of which were designed to support an agile force far 
superior to the “muscle-bound and clumsy” “industrial-age dinosaurs” which were the 
legacy of outmoded Cold War thinking.57 
As the U.S. military began to withdraw from their engagements in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, funding streams for contractors who had tooled up in support for network-
centric warfare and force transformation also began to evaporate, and businesses 
looking for alternative markets for their C4ISR platforms found a ready partner in 
                                                   
56 See Jeffrey L. Groh, Network-centric warfare: Leveraging the power of information, 1 
USAWC GUIDE TO NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY 323–338 
(2008); ANTHONY DEKKER, A TAXONOMY OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE ARCHITECTURES 
(2008), 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA488254 (last 
visited Sep 20, 2015); PETER J. DOMBROWSKI, EUGENE GHOLZ & ANDREW L. ROSS, MILITARY 
TRANSFORMATION AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY AFTER NEXT: THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE (2003). 
57 See John Ferris, Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a 
Revolution in Military Intelligence?, 19 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 199–225 
(2004); PETER J. DOMBROWSKI, EUGENE GHOLZ & ANDREW L. ROSS, MILITARY 
TRANSFORMATION AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY AFTER NEXT: THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE (2003); Steve Niva, Disappearing violence: 
JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare, 44 SECURITY DIALOGUE 185–
202 (2013); Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz & Andrew L. Ross, Selling military 
transformation: The defense industry and innovation, 46 ORBIS 523–536 (2002); Clay Wilson, 
Network Centric Warfare: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, (2004), 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA476256 (last 
visited Sep 20, 2015). 
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civilian law enforcement agencies.58 Like the military of the mid-1990s, police 
departments had also discovered the the promise of network-centricity, a concept that 
fit well within the quasi-military organizational structures found in most police 
organizations.59 Beginning in the mid-1970s, police departments, especially those in 
larger U.S. cities, began to feel political pressure to address what was widely seen as a 
crime epidemic and the “downward spiral of urban decay” that accompanied a post-
industrial economic slowdown.60 The standard tactics built around the police patrol car 
did not seem to be having any real success in reducing the crime rate, and law 
enforcement agencies were looking for alternatives. 
In 1982, The Atlantic Monthly published an article written by two social scientists 
who, after studying the tactics of police departments, concluded that disorder and crime 
are inextricably linked, and therefore addressing the petty crimes associated with 
community disorder—such as loitering, vandalism, and public intoxication, “humble” 
crimes that were generally considered unworthy of police attention—law enforcement 
agencies will in turn prevent the more serious crimes from flourishing in those areas.61 
The approach became known as “broken windows policing,” named for the tendency for 
buildings with a broken window to implicitly encourage further window breaking and 
                                                   
58 See Peter Andreas & Richard Price, From war fighting to crime fighting: transforming the 
American national security state, 3 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW 31–52 (2001). 
59 Id. 
60 See George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders’ Views of the 
New York City Story, 88 THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY (1973-) 1217 
(1998); James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken windows, 249 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29–38 
(1982). 
61 See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken windows, 249 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29–38 
(1982). 
 23
other forms of vandalism, a phenomenon described by Stanford psychologist Philip 
Zimbardo in his well-known abandoned car experiment.62 
Police departments in large American cities began to take an active interest in the 
broken windows theory, and by the late 1980s and early 1990s, police departments in 
New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles had all implemented some version of this 
model.63 In New York, then-mayor Rudy Giuliani introduced a version of broken 
windows known as “zero-tolerance” policing, which placed a greater emphasis the sort 
of “quality of life” issues that Wilson and Kelling pointed out in their original work.64 As 
an early adopter of the broken windows model, the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) quickly discovered that any effective implementation of such a program would 
require curbing disorder not only on the streets, but also within the police department 
itself, which had been in a decades-long decline of poor leadership, corruption, and an 
                                                   
62 Zimbardo established a field study to demonstrate the effects of decaying community 
on crime. In his experiment, Zimbardo “abandoned” cars in generally good condition in 
multiple locations in The Bronx and Palo Alto. While the cars left in Palo Alto were 
generally reported to police and left unmolested, the cars in the Bronx were almost 
immediately vandalized and stripped of valuable parts. The key difference between these 
two cities, observed Zimbardo, was the strong sense of community in Palo Alto, where 
people cared about what happened in their neighborhood, and the comparative lack of 
such a community sentiment in The Bronx. Zimbardo concluded that a breakdown of 
shared community values could lead to a certain anonymity that allowed for petty and 
serious crime to take hold. See Diary of a Vandalized Car, 93 TIME 68 (1969). 
63 See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken windows: New evidence from New York City 
and a five-city social experiment, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 271–320 (2006). 
64 Giuliani’s NYPD put special emphasis on prostitution, graffiti, low-level drug offences, 
and “aggressive” panhandling as symptoms of urban decay and disorder. These petty 
offenses had been largely ignored by police in all but the most extreme cases up to this 
point, and Giuliani promulgated this no-tolerance approach as a method of “reclaiming 
the open spaces of New York.” See Judith Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police 
Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 171–187 (1999). 
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overall breakdown of discipline.65 Addressing these (not unrelated) problems in a city 
the size of New York, with a sworn police force numbering in the tens of thousands, 
would require an approach that could go beyond classical organizational techniques.66 
The data- and network-centric approaches made possible by the rapid technological 
advances beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and implemented as a successful 
proof-of-concept by Wal-Mart during this time, began to instill in the NYPD—and other, 
similarly situated police departments—a growing faith in algorithms and automated 
decision support tools as their Rosetta Stone.67 
C. Drugs, Terrorism, and the Blurring of Military and Civilian 
Spheres 
 
The confluence of military and police use of data- and network-centric 
approaches in their hitherto separate spheres can be traced in its earliest forms to the 
war on drugs.68 As drug trafficking began to be seen not only as a law enforcement issue, 
but also a threat to national security, military and police agencies began to engage as 
partners in this effort, sometimes through the exchange of ideas, sometimes quite 
                                                   
65 See John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The New York City police department’s Compstat: 
dream or nightmare?, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICE SCIENCE & MANAGEMENT 218–231 
(2006). 
66 The NYPD had 31,236 full-time sworn officers in 1990. This number does not include 
part-time and administrative staff. See BRIAN A. REAVES, POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN LARGE 
CITIES, 1990-2000 (2011). 
67 See John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The New York City police department’s Compstat: 
dream or nightmare?, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICE SCIENCE & MANAGEMENT 218–231 
(2006); Peter K. Manning, Information technologies and the police, CRIME AND JUSTICE 349–398 
(1992). We will examine the details of this new approach in Section III, infra. 
68 Early manifestations of police militarization took traditional forms, where military 
equipment, such as assault rifles and armored personnel carriers, and their associated 
tactics were adopted by civilian police departments, justified by the increased threat 
(real or perceived) from drug trafficking in major U.S. cities. See Sandra Bass, Policing 
Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 156–176 (2001). 
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literally, through interagency actions.69 These activities were complicated by the fact 
that the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibited the use of federal military forces 
for domestic law enforcement purposes.70 To address this legal obstacle, Congress 
amended the Posse Comitatus Act in 1981 to allow for military support of civilian law 
enforcement agencies, with the clear legislative intent that this military-law 
enforcement cooperation be employed in counterdrug operations.71  
A vivid example of the literal law enforcement-military partnership in the drug 
war can be found in the 1988 formation of Joint Task Force-6, now known as Joint Task 
Force-South (JTF-South), which combined combat and reconnaissance forces from the 
Department of Defense (DoD), intelligence services, and civilian law enforcement 
agencies to patrol sections of the U.S.-Mexican border on drug interdiction missions. 
The regular armed border patrols by military personnel abruptly stopped in 1997, after a 
young U.S. Marine shot and killed an unarmed civilian. The American public’s appetite 
for the use of military troops within its borders evaporated after this incident, only to be 
revived on September 11, 2001.72  
                                                   
69 See EVAN MUNSING & CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE-SOUTH: THE 
BEST KNOWN, LEAST UNDERSTOOD INTERAGENCY SUCCESS (2011). 
70 Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law 
Enforcement, YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 383–442 (2003). 
71 The 1981 Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act encouraged 
military agencies to supply intelligence, equipment, and training to civilian police 
departments. In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress continued to expand the military’s 
ability to work directly with civilian law enforcement, through such legislation as the 
National Defense Authorization Act, which authorized and funded direct National 
Guard participation in drug operations. See EVAN MUNSING & CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, JOINT 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE-SOUTH: THE BEST KNOWN, LEAST UNDERSTOOD INTERAGENCY 
SUCCESS (2011), http://cpluslab.in/opp/archi.pdf (last visited Sep 24, 2015); Sean J. Kealy, 
Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, YALE LAW & 
POLICY REVIEW 383–442 (2003). 
72 The circumstances of the civilian shooting by JTF-6 personnel are quite tragic, yet 
should have been foreseeable under the circumstances. The shooting took place at night, 
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The terrorist attacks of 9/11 opened the floodgates on law enforcement-military 
cooperation, with many of the political and legal objections to such partnerships 
disappearing almost overnight.73 This sudden paradigm shift, brought on by a level of 
terroristic violence previously unthinkable in the United States, created an environment 
within which the traditionally separate spheres of military and civilian law enforcement 
began to significantly blur.74 The military contractors, large and small, that tooled up to 
support the war effort—both the literal combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as 
                                                   
when JTF-6 Marines were using night vision equipment to patrol a section of the U.S.-
Mexican border. Though every Marine was armed, their explicit orders were to limit 
their operations to observation and reconnaissance, relaying all suspicious activity to 
civilian law enforcement for possible action. When the JTF-6 Marines thought they 
heard gunfire in the area, they immediately returned fire, killing a civilian. As 
commentators later pointed out, this sort of tragedy was inevitable, when you put armed 
marines, trained for combat, in a law enforcement role. JTF-6 further exacerbated the 
inherent problems of military-civilian law enforcement activities through their direct 
involvement in the 1993 siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, TX. See EVAN 
MUNSING & CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE-SOUTH: THE BEST 
KNOWN, LEAST UNDERSTOOD INTERAGENCY SUCCESS (2011), http://cpluslab.in/opp/archi.pdf 
(last visited Sep 24, 2015); EVAN MUNSING & CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK 
FORCE-SOUTH: THE BEST KNOWN, LEAST UNDERSTOOD INTERAGENCY SUCCESS (2011), 
http://cpluslab.in/opp/archi.pdf (last visited Sep 24, 2015). 
73 Anti-terrorism military cooperation programs within U.S. civilian law enforcement 
agencies had, of course, existed prior to the events of 9/11, with some commentators 
arguing that the fight against terrorism was a far better use of military-law enforcement 
partnerships than the war on drugs, since military units were far better trained and 
equipped to address the special needs of counter-terror operations. See Sean J. Kealy, 
Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, YALE LAW & 
POLICY REVIEW 383–442 (2003). In fact, terrorism was widely seen as a critical facet of Fourth 
Generation Warfare, which seemed to justify these military-civilian law enforcement 
partnerships even further. See text accompanying note XX, supra. These early efforts remained 
somewhat controversial, however, even among military leaders prior to 2001. These 
controversies ended quite abruptly after 9/11. As Cofer Black, the former head of the CIA’s 
Counterterroism Center put it when he appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
“[T]here was ‘before’ 9/11 and ‘after’ 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off.” See Statement of 
Cofer Black: Joint Investigation Into September 11: September 26, 2002, , 
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/092602black.html (last visited Sep 24, 2015). 
74 See P. B. Kraska, Militarization and Policing--Its Relevance to 21st Century Police, 1 
POLICING 501–513 (2007). 
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well as the larger, more metaphorical sense—began making much of this materiel 
available to civilian law enforcement agencies, including machine guns, semiautomatic 
shotguns, night vision equipment, sniper rifles, combat uniforms, grenades, and high-
tech surveillance gear.75 Many civilian police departments were especially appreciative 
of the expansion of two DoD programs designed to equip law enforcement agencies with 
military gear through the transfer or direct purchase of materiel.76 Because of the highly 
visible nature of military equipment such as armored personnel carriers, flash-bang 
grenades, and sniper rifles, much of the subsequent attention from those examining the 
increased militarization of civilian police forces has been focused on these items.77 But 
the use of this sort of military gear by civilian law enforcement is largely limited to 
special police units, and is not typically found on the average patrol officer.78 It is the 
widespread and increased adoption by civilian police agencies of military intelligence 
                                                   
75 See Peter B. Kraska & Louis J. Cubellis, Militarizing mayberry and beyond: Making sense of 
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76 See Karena Rahall, The Green to Blue Pipeline: Defense Contractors and the Police 
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technologies, many of which are integrated invisibly into existing police information and 
decision support tools, which is likely to have a more dramatic impact across entire 
police departments. This invisibility, coupled with an unproven—or misplaced—faith in 
these technologies, has led to a growing system of structural surveillance that has had a 
disparate racial impact in many cases. 
III. The Expansion of Algorithmic Policing Strategies 
A. Early Data-Centric Efforts: Compstat and Its Kin 
When then-mayor Rudy Giuliani first began implementing New York City’s 
version of broken windows policing in the early 1990s, he recognized that the disorder 
to be addressed could be found not only on the city’s streets, but also within the ranks of 
the NYPD.79 Significantly changing the direction of an organization the size of the 
NYPD—as a shift to a broken windows policing model surely would—would be a difficult 
task in even the most functional of police departments, something New York City had 
not seen for decades.80 The organizational management tools necessary for such an 
endeavor simply did not exist until advances in information technology opened up the 
possibility of automated, data- and network-centric decision support systems that could 
take vast amounts of raw data as input, analyze those data, and provide critical insights 
to its human users, all within a relative blink of an eye—the promise of such systems 
bordered on the magical.81 It was exactly this sort of tool kit that a few forward thinkers 
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80 Id.  
81 While the term big data analytics hadn’t yet made its way into our lexicon in the early 
1990s, the concepts and principles therein had begun to take form. While the hopes of 
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within the NYPD proposed as a solution to their burgeoning organizational management 
problem. 
In 1994 NYPD Commissioner William Bratton revealed the Compstat program as 
a centralized solution to the department’s organizational dilemma.82 The goal of the 
program was to obtain accurate, up-to-date crime statistics at every level within the 
department, something that had proven impossible up to that point.83 By requiring 
patrol officers to keep records of their daily activities, including stops, arrests, and the 
details of each incident, the NYPD could collect these data on a computer database, 
which allowed them to generate weekly books of city-wide statistics they could slice and 
dice as they saw fit: if they wanted statistics on gun crimes specifically, or wished to 
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OF POLICE SCIENCE & MANAGEMENT 218–231 (2006). 
83 See John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The New York City police department’s Compstat: 
dream or nightmare?, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICE SCIENCE & MANAGEMENT 218–231 
(2006). 
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compare precinct activity, they could do so with relative ease.84 With these data and 
analysis tools, the NYPD could now begin to efficiently address the city’s broken 
windows trouble spots, and do so by directing the minimum amount of manpower to the 
right place at the right time, which was exactly the outcome of this crisis of control 
Giuliani and Bratton sought.85 
The NYPD began to see a significant amount of success with the Compstat 
system, both with their ability to address the “quality of life crimes” highlighted by 
broken windows policing, as well as in their ability to effectively manage a large and 
growing police force.86 Soon, other cities began to emulate and adapt Compstat systems 
within their own police departments, and this successful adoptions gave Compstat a fair 
amount of national publicity, and was touted, along with broken windows policing, as 
the new paradigm of crime prevention in the United States.87  
With the early success of Compstat also came a redoubled faith in the possibilities 
of automated law enforcement intelligence systems, allowing police departments to do 
more with less.88 As police departments became increasingly convinced that the broken 
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85 See James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski & David Weisburd, Making sense of COMPSTAT: 
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windows model of policing, with its dynamic, problem-oriented approach, would replace 
the old, static bureaucratic model that police agencies had relied on for generations, 
they began to accept and explore more deeply the managerial tools and techniques 
offered by algorithmic, data-driven systems.89 This new thinking sparked a flurry of 
data- and network-centric experiments in law enforcement agencies around the world, 
and revived a global interest in an intelligence-based model of policing that had been 
deployed by British police departments since the 1980s.90 
B. The Rise of Intelligence-Led Policing 
The British model of “intelligence led policing” was developed in part as a 
response to the privatization initiatives in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s, where 
portions of government services were either taken over by private companies, or 
adopted a private business model within their organizations, effectively becoming quasi-
private agencies.91 The British National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), originally 
organized to address drug trafficking, and later expanded to include organized crime 
generally, adopted a business data processing model to develop the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM), a nationwide system for use by all police agencies across the 
UK, replacing their existing bureaucratic management processes with an intelligence-
led policing model.92 This model had been developed by British authorities to mimic the 
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traditional military intelligence model, where data are collected and analyzed in order to 
identify patterns and generate actionable intelligence to best prioritize the deployment 
of patrols based on a set of problem-oriented goals.93 
It is not difficult to see the allure of such a system. The combination of tightened 
budgets, increased public concern over crime and disorder, and a rising perception that 
the world had become a more dangerous place due in large part to drug trafficking, 
terrorism, and a general breakdown of civil order, created an environment that made 
automated solutions to these problems all the more credible. Rapid advances in 
technology and research into data mining and automated, intelligent decision support 
systems began to instill in police departments a newfound enthusiasm for technological 
methods not generally seen since the days of Sputnik and the space race. Researchers 
began looking for existing mathematical and physical models which could be leveraged 
to provide even faster and more accurate intelligence solutions.94 By the late 1990s, 
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police departments began to consider the possibility that intelligence led policing, 
coupled with advanced technologies and analytical tools, could move law enforcement 
agencies beyond mere crime fighting into the realm of crime prevention.95 
C. The Tantalizing Prospect of Predictive Policing 
Organizations seeking to minimize their respective OODA loops have followed 
Boyd’s logic to an inevitable conclusion: Instead of merely seeking methods to shrink 
the OODA loop, find ways to tighten the loop to a point where it has “inverted into 
itself”—that is, modify the decision cycle to be predictive, rather than reactive.96 The 
possibility of preventing crime before it actually happens has been the Holy Grail of 
police departments, especially when local, state, and federal governments were actively 
looking for ways to cut back on police budgets.97 The apparent successes of broken 
windows and zero tolerance policing backed by sophisticated decision support systems 
like Compstat and intelligence led policing, gave many in law enforcement the firm 
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belief that these systems and methodologies would eventually yield tools that would 
collect the massive amounts of data now available from inside and outside of police 
departments, swiftly store and analyze those data, and produce results “to anticipate, 
prevent and respond more effectively to future crime.”98 
A common trope among police department is that an experienced and talented 
officer can apply their knowledge and and analytical skills to attain an imperfect version 
of predictive policing, but that model does not scale well.99 The benefit these new 
analytical tools and methods could bring to these officers could mean the difference 
between investigating a crime that just occurred versus preventing the crime from 
happening in the first place.100 The savings to society in administrative costs, property 
damage, and human lives alone make this a worthy goal for a data- and network-centric 
police force.  
But for such a police intelligence system to work as advertised, one needs to 
provide it with as much good data as possible from as broad a sampling as possible so 
the pattern recognition models can achieve the nearest thing to a god’s-eye view, and 
allowing the analyst to find the proverbial needle in the haystack.101 This means police 
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agencies need to turn to nontraditional sources of information as well as developing and 
refining internal data sources.102 The risks inherent in such an approach—especially if 
implementations and approaches are rushed or otherwise undertaken without a full 
understanding of the implications – can include not only the more obvious issues of 
privacy and fairness, but also technical liabilities attributable to cybersecurity and the 
long-term effects on due process, all of which present serious ethical questions and 
responsibilities.103 
IV. The Enhancement of Structural Surveillance and De Facto 
Race Bias 
A. Criticisms of the Broken Windows Policing Model 
The broken widows policing model, along with the collection of technologies and 
techniques supporting this approach, have met with a growing body of criticisms, even 
as police departments continue to adopt and promote these methods.104 Core to many of 
these criticisms is the central role “disorder” plays in the broken windows model, 
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specifically, the subjective definition and measurement of the term, as well as the 
limited beneficiaries of this approach.105 These criticisms have seriously questioned the 
the premise of broken windows, citing statistics that indicate that the broken windows 
model has a measureable, direct negative effect on the very neighborhoods and 
communities whose “hot spots” were supposedly the beneficiaries of increased police 
focus.106 
Among the sharpest of criticisms of the broken windows policing model is based 
on evidence that, whatever the original intent was of such programs, their 
implementations have been less about policing disorder than the control of poor 
neighborhoods and poor people, most of whom are racial minorities.107 The 
combination of the longstanding practice within the American legal system of using race 
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as a signal of increased risk of criminal behavior with the incentivizing of police officers 
to gather “intelligence” data through arbitrary stop and frisk programs (sometimes 
referred to as “enhanced Terry stops”) to feed into automated intelligence systems, has 
created an environment where racial minorities end up bearing the costs of broken 
windows, while wealthy, white communities tend to see the majority of its benefits.108 
The societal disorder that broken windows policing targets has been shown to be a very 
fluid concept, where the perceptions of a minority neighborhood’s residents are often far 
different than those of the police officers patrolling those neighborhoods, who 
frequently come from other, wealthier neighborhoods.109 
The result of the intelligence data collected based on race or class bias, or 
parochial perceptions of the definition of societal disorder, creates an inherent bias in 
automated decision support systems that tends to be reinforced with every trip around 
the OODA loop.110 This result can be directly traced to the sort of feedback loops data-
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centric decision support systems like Compstat are prone to encounter.111 That is, if the 
data used to initiate an automated decision support tool is biased or otherwise flawed, 
the “actionable intelligence” that emerges will likely also be biased or flawed. If this bad 
intelligence is then acted upon, the resulting stops or arrests will likely generate even 
more bad data, which is then fed back into the decision support system, and so on.112  
B. Algorithms, Data, Neutrality, and Bias 
What makes automated, predictive policing systems so attractive as a solution for 
law enforcement agencies seeking increased efficiencies, is the same thing that makes 
them potentially dangerous: We tend to trust algorithms and data implicitly, since we 
assume that computers have no bias, and numbers do not lie.113 This common 
misconception is based upon two fundamental misunderstandings of automated 
decision support or expert systems. First, while it is true that computers, as finite state 
machines that at their core (no pun intended) are strictly limited to the instructions we 
give them through their programming, it does not follow that the algorithms we run on 
these computers are necessarily unbiased. Computer programs—algorithms coded by 
humans into a form a computer’s chipset can interpret—are written with the objectives, 
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design choices, and general experiences of the programmer as background. The series of 
instructions, data structures, and design choices that end up in a finished computer 
program can often translate subtle biases, often in unexpected ways.114 [Complete 
section on NFL theorems—working on appropriate way to represent them here] 
For example, from an algorithmic modeling perspective, incorrect or imbalanced 
input data has long been shown to lead to biased results.115 Perhaps the most commonly 
used statistical method used in predictive modeling systems is linear regression.116 The 
most widely used method for parameter estimation in this category is maximum 
likelihood linear regression, a technique employed across many domains, including 
military and police predictive intelligence systems.117 In systems such as these, the data 
used often contain a large number of events belonging to one class, while the other class 
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contains only a few data points, a data disparity known as class imbalance.118 This 
phenomenon often occurs in crime data where the event of interest (the crime) is 
sampled far more frequently than non-events. This problem also manifests itself in the 
differences in class data representations between the sample set and the actual 
population, known as sampling bias.119 There are, of course, statistical sampling 
methods to mitigate these effects, but there is no clear consensus as to which method of 
class distribution sampling will work best in all—or even most—situations.120 The best 
solutions tend to be those that are specially selected based on such factors as the 
statistical methods employed, the population size, the sample size, and specifics 
regarding the event in question.121 In plain language, this means that a one-size-fits-all 
solution is likely to produce questionable results, at best, and at worst, dangerously 
biased results. This danger becomes increasingly amplified when one examines the 
trend of police analysis being extended from the realm of geospatial analysis—predicting 
which neighborhoods are most likely to be crime hot spots—to the individual, where 
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police keep close tabs on people who, according to predictive algorithms, are more likely 
to be involved in future crimes.122  
C. The Introduction of Automation Bias 
The rise of the information and audit society and the associated increase in the 
use of automated information systems in organizational decision making often leads to 
an overreliance on—and overconfidence in—the results of these systems. This 
automation bias leads to misuse of automated intelligence systems combined with 
automation induced user complacency.123 The negative effects of this automation bias 
have been seen in healthcare, transportation, power distribution, defense, and space 
exploration domains, often with serious, life-threatening consequences.124 There are 
multiple reasons for this behavior, including our natural tendencies to seek out paths of 
least cognitive effort, to expend less energy when part of a team (including teams with 
automated members), and to treat computers as decision-making authorities.125 These 
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errors have been further categorized into two classes that manifest in automated 
environments: omission errors, where operators fail to respond to system anomalies 
because the automated system fails to detect or warn of them; and commission errors, 
where users blindly follow incorrect guidance from automated systems in spite of 
contraindications from other information sources.126 Studies have repeatedly shown that 
automation bias of both types leads to users making incorrect decisions at a rate as high 
as 75%, even when the information they needed to make the correct decision was readily 
available.127 
Automation bias becomes especially dangerous when life or liberty is at stake. 
Multiple studies in domains such as health care, air transportation, and military 
command and control have repeatedly shown how bias and complacency lead users of 
automated systems to make very costly mistakes.128 In military environments especially, 
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overconfidence in the authority of automated decision support systems can be 
particularly catastrophic, where the importance of situational awareness is 
paramount.129 The average person is well equipped to engage in naturalistic decision 
making processes, where one is expected to solve real-world problems under a certain 
amount of stress.130 We are, however, prone to overreliance on sources of information 
guidance that we regard as authoritative.131 Military intelligent decision support systems 
operate within organizational hierarchies wherein users are predisposed, through their 
training, to defer to authorities within their supervisory structure, a trait that remains in 
effect when users of these systems seek guidance from algorithms and data structures.132 
The natural result is an amplification of automation bias in these overtly hierarchical 
environments, where users exhibit tendencies to rely exclusively on automated systems, 
even when conflicting information is presented by other available systems.133 The 
transfer of military intelligent decision support systems to civilian law enforcement 
organizations, where the paramilitary organizational structure closely resembles that of 
the military, makes police susceptible to the same dangerous automation bias exhibited 
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in military environments. So how do law enforcement organizations take advantage of 
continued advances in automated intelligence and decision support techniques without 
either further alienating the communities they serve or succumbing to various data- and 
algorithm-based biases? 
V. A Community Policing Solution to Algorithmic Race Bias 
 
Of course, to completely ignore the opportunities presented by advances in 
automation makes no sense. There are many tasks that computers simply do better than 
humans, such as repetitive tasks, rapid response to control tasks, rule-based deductive 
reasoning, and simultaneous task handling.134 As our systems—both human and 
computer—grow increasingly complex, we need automation to give us the enhanced 
capabilities to handle time-critical and complex control environments. The trick, then, is 
to recognize the critical role automated information systems play in these domains, but 
at the same time, maintain an informed awareness of the pitfalls an overreliance on 
automated decision support can bring. This is of special import to law enforcement 
agencies, who have a special duty to their communities not only to enforce the laws, but 
to protect and maintain the health and safety of their everyone in those communities. 
Allocating the appropriate amount of functionality between police officers and 
automated systems is critical to this role. In this section, I recommend a two element 
approach to this problem that takes into account both the important social role police 
play within their communities as well as the phenomenon of automation and data bias 
that can artificially reinforce racial disparities in police treatment. 
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A. A Return to the Original Intent of Community Policing 
A significant part of the original broken windows policing concept articulated by 
Wilson and Kelling was the role of the police officer in reassuring community members 
of their safety, and maintaining a high degree of sensitivity to signaling by community 
residents, with respect not only to criminal activity, but also with their comfort with the 
police agency itself.135 Community policing requires a more holistic approach to the 
problem of public safety that goes beyond mere crime fighting to encompass overall 
community health, safety, and quality of life.136 Under this model, crime fighting was not 
an end in itself, but the means toward healthier communities, and was seen as a more 
modern, inclusive method of policing.137  
Too many implementations of broken windows and intelligence led policing 
models, however, failed to follow through on this part of the theory. Rather than 
measure their performance—and direct their activities—using data that reflected a 
community’s overall health and quality of life, systems like Compstat relied heavily, 
sometimes exclusively, on traditional crime statistics, such as the number of stops, 
arrests, and clearance rates, despite the fact that these metrics have repeatedly been 
shown to have little to no bearing on overall community safety.138 Sadly, the reasoning 
behind this flawed approach to the original community policing concept lies in the fact 
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that these crime statistics are easy to collect and measure, and police departments have 
developed a high degree of comfort with these metrics over the years.139 Thus, the most 
direct approach to solving the problem of bad data leading to biased results from data-
centric decision support tools is to require that police departments retool their data 
collection and analysis efforts toward more meaningful metrics.  
Another misinterpreted requirement of the original Wilson and Kelling model is 
the concept of proactive policing. Most police departments implementing broken 
windows models have designed their systems as incident-oriented frameworks, which 
do a poor job at addressing levels of criminality in a community, and serve mainly to 
feed a cycle of incarceration.140 The Wilson and Kelling method of proactive policing 
focuses instead on the root causes of criminality, such as poverty, economic and 
ecological injustice, and racism, where police departments form part of a larger 
community team to go beyond the punishing of window breakers, and actually fix the 
broken windows.141  
Finally, community policing requires police departments to hone their 
sensitivities to community and cultural norms, since perceptions of social disorder can 
be highly dependent upon time, place, and circumstance, and most police officers are 
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not residents of the communities they patrol.142 Public perceptions can also vary over 
time, so definitions of disorder often fall into the “I can’t define it, but I know it when I 
see it” category.143 When police officers develop a feel for their communities they patrol, 
they will also benefit their departments by providing better, more meaningful 
intelligence data, which can then be used to improve their decision support outcomes.144 
Failure to adhere to these original community policing standards has had a 
disproportionate negative impact on poor and minority communities. The policies and 
procedures put in place by police departments using automated decision support tools 
like compstat in  support of broken windows policing regimes had a distinctly negative 
effect in minority communities.145 As discussed in Section III above, this problem is not 
a new one, but has instead one that has been exacerbated by the use of military tactics 
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and technologies.146 The rush by information societies to observe, collect, record, and 
evaluate all available data from our environments is especially felt by law enforcement 
agencies, who are already obligated to collect evidence.147 This predilection leads police 
to treat their communities as intelligence landscapes, where people are viewed as “data 
elements” to be analyzed, resulting in dissociative or adversarial relationships between 
cop and citizen.148 
This result is counter to the original intent behind community policing.149 In 
hindsight, a certain level of disconnect between the algorithmic policing model and the 
community policing model, since algorithmic policing seeks to build a centralized, 
automated police force that operates from the inside out, and the community policing 
model requires a process that begins and ends with the citizen.150 But a key driver 
behind broken windows and algorithmic policing is a heightened fear of crime and 
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disorder, a fear that has not diminished significantly over the past few decades, despite 
the nearly universal drop in crime rates nationally.151 A necessary part of this 
transformation, therefore, is to cultivate a base level of trust within police organizations 
as well as every stakeholder community. One method of building this trust is to continue 
to use the automated policing systems, but reengineer them to focus on local community 
goals rather than those of police departments or outside interests. Transparency is 
critical to to this step’s success—police management must create a system through 
which community members can not only seek police assistance, but can examine the 
systems and goals the police themselves use to guide their day-to-day patrol activities. 
Another critical part of this transformation is an immediate increase in accountability 
within police departments. Automation bias, data bias, and corrupted procedures and 
goals often give police departments a certain amount of artificial cover when things go 
badly. Technological opacity is no substitute for human accountability up and down the 
management chain within law enforcement agencies. Finally, law enforcement resources 
must be shifted towards a citizen-focused organization, giving rank-and-file police 
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officers the power to help drive automation policy, while giving them the ability to use 
their own problem solving skills outside of the automated process. 
B. Incorporate Outcome and Process Feedback Into Existing 
Systems 
We live in a time in which our lives are increasingly influenced and affected—
whether we know it or not—by data, algorithms, and machine learning.152 It would be a 
mistake to believe that police departments would somehow be immune to this trend. 
Therefore, the solution to modern (or post-modern) problems of public safety is not to 
go the way of Ned Ludd, but to develop police decision support systems with an eye 
toward civil rights, and avoiding race discrimination and economic injustice. 
The key principle in developing any of these systems is transparency. As we saw 
in Floyd et al. v. City of New York,153 the case that held the NYPD’s stop and frisk 
program violated the Fourth Amendment by systematically conducting warrantless 
searches of pedestrians, the majority of which were African-American or Hispanic, 
opaque police policy decisions implementing a broken windows policing model create 
an insular environment that often fails to punish bad actors and creates perverse 
incentives.154 Further, since most police departments do not employ software developers 
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or statisticians, they are forced to purchase their decision support systems from third 
party contractors.155 The same principles of transparency should apply to contractors so 
as to avoid these problems. 
Next, algorithmic and predictive policing systems need to be based upon accurate 
and meaningful data. For example, police stop and frisk programs, despite criticisms 
and claims of racial bias inherent in these programs, have been widely supported by law 
enforcement agencies based on their assertions that, while more minorities are subject 
to these suspicionless stops, it is only because minorities commit disproportionately 
more crimes than whites, and not due to any particular bias of police officers and 
departments.156 In support of these arguments, police often cite automated police 
intelligence systems, such as compstat, to justify these stops.157 Statistical studies 
conducted on stop and frisk data, however, have shown that minorities are far more 
likely subjects of these programs, with statistical patterns pointing toward a structural 
racial bias, reinforced through automated decision support tools.158 
Finally, recalling the no free lunch theorems,159 we must be cognizant of the 
limitations of purely technical solutions to human problems. Mathematical and 
computer models of real-life systems can, of course, provide critical insights into 
complex systems, but they are imperfect. Algorithms for deriving patterns from large 
amounts of seemingly random data are getting better as research and technological 
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advances progress, but their most effective use within the broken windows policing 
model is as a supplemental tool that informs human decision making, not as a digital 
crutch upon which bad practices and biased policing are allowed to rest. 
Further, known biases in automation systems can be mitigated through a number 
of established means. For example, automation bias and automation complacency can 
be avoided by increasing accountability by the users of a system.160 By requiring system 
operators to provide complete justifications for their decisions—beyond “the machine 
told me so”—users will be driven toward deeper cognitive engagement and awareness of 
alternative information sources.161 The level of automation used in a situation should 
also be carefully assessed on a domain basis. That is, the level of automation available 
can exceed the level of automation necessary for a given situation.162 Repetitive, rigid 
tasks that expect no user decision-making flexibility are often good candidates for a high 
degree of automation, while those tasks that rely on human intuition, pattern 
perception, and contextual reasoning, are best served with lower levels of automation.163 
Much of the work of law enforcement falls into this latter category. 
For the time being, algorithmic and predictive approaches are only as useful as 
their human creators. Selecting the proper policing model that will work in every 
instance is likely impossible, so one of the most important decisions in the field of 
machine learning is the selection of the model that will provide superior results for a 
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particular problem, a task which still requires an experienced and informed human in 
the loop.164 But this fact can be leveraged as a benefit, rather than a liability, by using 
predictive systems to decentralize police command structures, and allow more creativity 
and initiative among rank-and-file patrol officers, characteristics which are critical to a 
true community policing model.165 
VI. Conclusion 
The problem of bias in algorithmic policing has deep roots, as evidenced above. 
Solutions to this problem cannot ignore technological advances that can help us make 
better, more efficient decisions, but at the same time, they cannot allow these 
technologies to subvert the proper role of public safety in our communities. We live in 
an information society that is, once again, experiencing a crisis of control that we are 
naturally inclined to solve through data and analytic methods. But our approach must 
be based on lessons learned from our successes and failures in this arena. Many of these 
failures have led to a trust deficit between authorities and the communities they govern, 
especially where racial prejudices have been part of these failures. Addressing these 
disparities in algorithmic policing cannot solve all of these problems, but it is a good 
start. 
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